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Abstract
Efficient design and evolution of complex software intensive systems rely on
the ability to make informed decisions as early as possible in the life cycle.
Such informed decisions should take both the intended functional and non-
functional properties into account. Especially regarding the latter, it is both
necessary to be able to predict properties and to prioritize them according to
well-defined criteria. In this paper we focus on the latter problem, that is
to say how to make trade-offs between non-functional properties of software
intensive systems. We provide an approach based on the elicitation of utility
functions from stake-holders and subsequent checks for consistency among these
functions. The approach is exploitable through an easy-to-use GUI, which is
also presented. Moreover, we describe the setup and the outcome of our two-fold
validation based on exploratory elicitations with students and practitioners.
Keywords: Non-functional properties, Decision-making, Trade-offs, Utility
functions
1. Introduction
Software is ubiquitous in our society and most companies in any applicative
domain rely on IT for their operations. Digitization and automation are no
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longer competitive advantages by themselves. Instead, as IT is becoming an
irreplaceable asset, proper IT used as a cornerstone of operational excellence
is simply essential and expected to be there. A consequence is that decision-
makers in any domain face crucial decisions regarding the evolution of their IT
portfolios: What should be bought off the shelf? What should be subscribed
to as a service? What can be found in open-source communities? What, if
anything, should be developed in-house? And, perhaps most importantly from
an architectural perspective, how should all these diverse IT components fit
together?
This challenge is faced by companies in essentially any domain, from the
automotive company deciding on which software to put in the next generation
car, to the SCADA system designer outlining the new control system for a
power grid or the financial service provider rolling out a new payment system
architecture. They all share two wishes: (1) to be able to select the best compo-
nents throughout their architectures, and (2) to do it in the early phases, before
all the details of their intended systems are actually known, in order to limit
costs. Indeed, the cost of extracting defects grows as a project progresses and
the products are developed – it is in fact much less expensive to correct errors
in the concept or design phases, whereas that cost can grow exponentially if
corrections are delayed to production and testing phases [1]. Thus, the ability
to make informed decisions based on sound reasoning early on in the life cycle
is pivotal.
Needless to say, though, it is very difficult to select IT components from
several different alternatives, when these alternatives are still on the drawing
board. One part of the problem is the estimation of the non-functional proper-
ties (hereafter simply “properties”) of the future component. How secure will
it be? How reliable? How maintainable? This is a classic set of topics that are
very interesting in their own right. In this paper, however, we focus on another
problem, which remains even when perfect property estimates are achieved: how
to make enlightened trade-offs between non-functional properties.
To make this problem more concrete, consider the software product quality
2
model defined in the ISO/IEC 25010 standard [2]. According to this standard,
system/software product quality consists of eight properties: (i) functional suit-
ability, (ii) performance efficiency, (iii) compatibility, (iv) usability, (v) relia-
bility, (vi) security, (vii) maintainability and (viii) portability. Assuming for
the sake of the argument that the estimates problem is solved (which it most
certainly is not), this means that each alternative software product – each op-
tion on the decision maker’s table – can be characterized by an 8-dimensional
vector. Also assuming that the properties can all be measured and mapped
onto a scale of, say, 0–10, the problem becomes one of selecting between al-
ternatives of the form A = (10, 10, 2, 10, 10, 5, 8, 1), B = (4, 9, 8, 10, 7, 0, 8, 9),
C = (7, 8, 7, 4, 7, 2, 7, 0).
This is a complex problem. Let us consider some of the possible trade-off
choice scenarios. By simply considering an unweighted mean of all properties, A
is the best. On the other hand, if portability (last) is the property to maximize,
B is the best; if the sum of functional suitability (first) and compatibility (third)
shall be maximized, then C is the best.
Only when there is dominance, i.e. one alternative being at least as good
as the others in each dimension, and strictly better in at least one, the choice
becomes trivial; unfortunately this is not the common case. Although difficult,
these choices are pivotal for efficient development and good quality of the result-
ing product. This paper focuses on trade-offs by providing an approach based
on the elicitation of utility functions from stake-holders and subsequent checks
for consistency among these functions.
This paper is based on a previous conference publication [3]. While most of
the theoretical contents are kept from our conference publication, for this paper
we ran a set of empirical elicitations with students and practitioners, which
are reported in Section 7. This represents the main original contribution of
this paper. Additionally, a few conceptual clarifications and modifications have
been made in the theoretical chapters, and the concluding discussion has been
updated to reflect the empirical results.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews
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some related work in order to put the contribution in context. It is followed by
Section 3 which introduces some key concepts, needed to understand the rest of
the paper. In Section 4, we introduce the elicitation of preferences with regard
to non-functional properties, and in Section 5 we discuss how to ensure the
consistency of the preferences thus elicited. Section 6 illustrates the framework
devised with an example. Section 7 reports the setup and outcomes of a two-
fold empirical elicitation. Section 8 discusses the contribution and Section 9
concludes the paper with a substantial discussion of future work.
2. Related work
There is an abundant literature on decision-making when developing or se-
lecting IT components and services. An early example is King and Schrems’
discussion of cost-benefit analysis in developing and operating information sys-
tems [4]. From our perspective it is interesting to note that they list five impor-
tant non-functional properties which have to be taken into account: accuracy,
response time, security, reliability, and flexibility. Interestingly, important parts
of ISO/IEC 25010 were thus known already in the late 70-ies.
One particular problem that has attracted a lot of attention is the dilemma
of in-house development vs. buying commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products.
The problem of identifying appropriate software engineering metrics for evalu-
ating COTS has been studied for a long time [5], as has the problem of setting
requirements on such metrics [6]. The actual decision-making is often done us-
ing optimization approaches [7], [8], in particular when the trade-off is between
two properties such as cost and reliability [9].
However, in general these problems are multi-dimensional, as explained in
Section 1, and many studies indeed treat them as such. For example, one
approach to solve such multi-criteria problems is to prioritize between the ob-
jectives in order to resolve inconsistencies, and then solve the resulting problem
algorithmically [10]. Another widely used approach is to apply the analytic
hierarchy process (AHP) to decompose the problem into sub-problems and re-
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solve differences between stakeholders [11], [12]. The kind of analysis most
closely related to ours is Pareto analysis, i.e. identifying alternatives that are
not dominated by any other alternatives, and then selecting solutions from this
so called Pareto front. For example, Neubauer and Stummer first determine
Pareto-efficient alternatives and then let the user interactively explore the so-
lution space to find the desired solution [13]. Michanan et al. apply similar
analysis to the trade-off problem between power consumption and performance,
using actual live performance data [14].
This paper is similar to much of the existing literature in that it takes the
multi-dimensionality of the problem seriously, and in that it aims to involve the
stakeholders to elicit important information to solve the problem. In partic-
ular, it can be seen as an off-shot from the Pareto analysis strand. It differs
from the existing literature in that it attempts to discuss the problem of trade-
offs between several non-functional properties systematically based on canonical
utility functions from the microeconomic literature, allowing for complications
like diminishing marginal utility in a way not captured by e.g. AHP or cumu-
lative voting. O¨sterlind et al. have worked in this direction previously [15], but
whereas they require the user to manually enter the parameters of utility func-
tions, a core idea in our paper is to elicit these in a user-friendly manner, so that
relatively powerful utility models can be built from relatively straight-forward
user input.
3. Preference and utility modeling
The preliminaries introduced in this section are standard. A good textbook
dealing with these concepts is Varian [16].
Preferences over bundles of goods (or, in our case, non-functional properties
of one good – a software system) are comparisons between vectors. x  y
means that the decision-maker thinks that the bundle x is at least as good as
the bundle y. For the preference relation  to order the bundles, it needs to
be complete (apply to all x and y in the alternatives set X), reflexive (x  x),
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and transitive (x  y & y  z⇒ x  z). The strict preference x  y can then
be defined to mean not y  x.
Any preference order that is complete, reflexive, transitive, and continuous
(i.e. the preference order is preserved in the limit of a sequence of goods) can
be represented by a continuous utility function, i.e. a function u : X → R such
that x  y if and only if u(x) > u(y). Such functions are convenient to use in
modeling and analysis of preferences. However, the assumptions do not always
hold. For example, intransitive preferences are readily found experimentally
[17].
There are several utility functions proposed in the literature. In the follow-
ing, we introduce three of the most common, which are all special cases of the
more general constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function.
One very simple utility function is the following:
u(x) = aTx (1)
Here, the utility of the bundle x of the n goods x1, x2, . . . , xn is just the sum
of these goods, weighted by the coefficients a = a1, a2, . . . , an. Under such
preferences, the goods are perfect substitutes, i.e. the decision-maker is willing
to switch between goods at a fixed ratio, viz. is indifferent between one unit
of x1 and
a1
a2
units of x2. Backup tape cartridges of 6 TB from brand A and
3 TB from brand B are a good example of (nearly) perfect substitutes, with
decision-makers willing to switch one A for 2 B (if they are similar with respect
to e.g. failure rates).
Another very simple utility model is the following:
u(x) = min{a1x1, a2x2, . . . , anxn} (2)
Here, the utility of the bundle x is the smallest xi as weighted by ai. This
is called Leontief preferences and the goods are perfect complements. Such
goods have to be consumed together, so additional units of one good without
simultaneous increases in all the others are no better. For a personal computer,
a decision-maker could have Leontief preferences for processor speed, cache size,
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and RAM size, because overall performance will be hampered by the worst of
them. If the RAM size is already the bottleneck, it makes no sense to decrease
RAM size in order to gain more processor speed – no matter how much processor
speed is offered. Thus with Leontief preferences, there are no trade-offs to be
made.
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Perfect substitutes utility model
(a) Perfect substitutes utility.
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G
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Leontief utility model
(b) Leontief (perfect comple-
ments) utility
Good 1
G
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d 
2
Cobb-Douglas utility model
(c) Cobb-Douglas utility
Figure 1: Indifference curves for different utility models. Brighter level curves represent
higher utilities, i.e. points on these curves are preferred to points on the darker curves. All
the combinations along a single level curve are equivalent, i.e. a decision-maker is indifferent
between them.
A third simple utility model is the following:
u(x) = xa11 x
a2
2 , . . . , x
an
n (3)
Here, the utility of the bundle x is a multiplicative function of the goods,
weighted by the exponents a1, a2, . . . , an. This is called Cobb-Douglas utility,
and represents a model where goods are neither perfect substitutes nor perfect
complements, but somewhere in between.
Level curves (or indifference curves, as they are often called) for the case
of two goods are shown in Fig. 1 for each of the three utility models. Higher
dimensional cases are analogous.
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4. Preference elicitation
4.1. Elicitation from a single indifference curve
A straightforward method for eliciting utility functions from decision-makers
is to identify alternatives where they are indifferent, i.e. to find points on an
indifference curve.
For convenience, assume that the trade-off is about two properties x and y. If
we have a number of pairs (x1, y1), (x2, y2), . . . , (xn, yn) on the same indifference
curve, that means by definition that they all entail the same utility uˆ.
In the linear case of perfect substitution, finding the weights a1 and a2 in
(1) just amounts to solving the (over-determined) linear system of equations:
x1 y1
...
...
xn yn

a1
a2
 ≈

uˆ
...
uˆ
 (4)
A least squares solution yields the best approximation of a1 and a2, and thus
the best approximation of a perfect substitution utility function, based on the
preferences stated.
The Cobb-Douglas case is almost as straightforward. Finding the weights
a1 and a2 in (3) amounts to solving the (over-determined) linear system of
equations found by taking logarithms of the original problem:
lnx1 ln y1
...
...
lnxn ln yn

a1
a2
 ≈

ln uˆ
...
ln uˆ
 (5)
A least squares solution yields the best approximation of a1 and a2, and thus the
best approximation of a Cobb-Douglas utility function, based on the preferences
stated.
The Leontief case is somewhat more difficult, due to its non-linear nature.
However, it can be solved by Newton’s algorithm, using suitable initial guesses
for a1 and a2 and iteratively correcting them. The objective function f to
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minimize is simply the vector or residuals:
f =

r1
...
rn
 = nmini=1
a1

x1
...
xn
 , a2

y1
...
yn

−

uˆ
...
uˆ
 (6)
(The min operator is, of course, applied n times to yield a vector of the appro-
priate length – once to each pair (a1xi, a2yi).)
Though f has kinks, derivatives can be found where it is piece-wise smooth.
The Jacobian is the following:
J =
(
∂f
∂a1
∂f
∂a2
)
=
=

 x1 if a1x1 < a2y10 otherwise
 y1 if a2y1 < a1x10 otherwise
...
... xn if a1xn < a2yn0 otherwise
 yn if a2yn < a1xn0 otherwise

(7)
The Jacobian can now be used to find appropriate correction terms δ1 and
δ2 to be added to a1 and a2 in each iteration:
−J
δ1
δ2
 ≈ f (8)
Upon reaching convergence, this solution yields a1 and a2, defining the best
approximation of a Leontief utility function based on the preferences stated.
In practice, of course, it is difficult to know the functional form of the utility
function a priori. Instead, solutions for all three alternatives can be found, and
the one with the smallest residual, as measured by an appropriate norm such
as the Euclidean, can be selected.1
1However, care must be taken when comparing residual vectors, since their magnitudes
depend on the magnitude of uˆ, which is arbitrary. More precisely, as uˆ increases, the residual
vector of (4), and the ai parameters of the solution, increase linearly with uˆ. This is of course
also the case for (5), but not for the original Cobb-Douglas problem, which (5) is the logarithm
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(a) Elicitation of alternatives. (b) Cobb-Douglas model
built from data.
Figure 2: Screenshots showing elicitation of alternatives with the same utility. The crosshairs
are used to place a point, using the mouse, in the graph. The functional form of the utility
model and its parameters are estimated based on the points placed.
An elicitation system of this kind was implemented for the purpose of being
able to estimate utility functions with respect to non-functional properties of
IT components. The interface is shown in Fig. 2(a).
To identify a point (i.e. combination of properties 1 and 2) as yielding a
certain utility, the decision-maker simply presses the Add point button and
uses the crosshairs to select the point in the graph. Once enough points have
been identified, the button Build model is used to build models, according
to Eqs. 4, 5, and 6–8, respectively. The solution with the smallest Euclidean
residual norm is selected and presented graphically to the decision-maker as
of. The residual vector of the original Cobb-Douglas problem instead increases exponentially,
whereas the ai parameters of the solution increase logarithmically with uˆ. Therefore, unless
residual vectors from different solution alternatives are somehow normalized before being
compared according to e.g. the Euclidean norm, the value of uˆ will have an undue influence on
the selection of utility model. One such normalization is to use the residual of the logarithmic
problem in (5), divide it with the arithmetic mean of the ai parameters, and compare it to
the residual of (4), similarly divided with the arithmetic mean of the ai parameters from
that solution. These normalized residuals are invariant under transformations of uˆ. This
complication was not fully appreciated in the original conference article.
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(a) Perfect substitutes model
built from data.
(b) Leontief model built from
data.
Figure 3: Screenshots showing elicitation of alternatives from several indifference curves.
shown in Fig. 2(b). The model built is presented including the points selected
by the user as well as the model level curve that most closely approximates
them. It should be noted, however, that the two-dimensional nature of the
presentation does not fully convey the goodness of an estimate, as the actual
residual is calculated as the difference in the third dimension – the utility along
the z axis. Thus, points seemingly close to the best fit in the x, y plane can still
have a big residual, if the utility function is steep in that vicinity.
4.2. Elicitation from several indifference curves
While we derived Eqs. 4, 5, and 6–8 to solve the case of building models from
a single indifference curve, it is straightforward to extend them to the case of
elicitation from several indifference curves. The only change needed is to modify
the uˆ vector so that it can contain a different utility uˆi for each pair (xi, yi).
Thus, points can be supplied on several indifference curves by the user. In the
interface shown in Fig. 2(a), this is done by modifying the Utility slider to the
right (set to 100 in the figure) before adding a point. The utility is displayed
together with the point in the graph.
Utility models built from several indifference curves are shown in Fig. 3.
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5. Consistency of elicited preferences
In the previous section, we limited ourselves to elicitation of utility functions
in pairwise trade-offs between properties. This is partly due to the simple fact
that the two-dimensional case is easier to illustrate, but it also has to do with the
fact that it is easier and less taxing for the user to do the elicitation as a sequence
of pairwise elicitations. However, this also raises the important question of how
to ensure consistency in elicited preferences.
More precisely, the property we want to ensure is transitivity – we want to
avoid the circular case where A ≺ B, B ≺ C, but also C ≺ A. For each kind
of pairwise utility functions elicited in the previous section, this holds locally
by virtue of the mathematical nature of the functional forms used. But if
several such pairwise elicited utility functions are combined, there is no a priori
guarantee of such consistency.
5.1. The linear case
The discussion of consistency is easiest in the perfect substitutes case (1).
This is similar to the analysis of monetary exchange rates [18], and to the
analytical hierarchy process [19], especially the AHP literature on consistency
[20]. Here, as noted above, the decision-maker is indifferent between one unit
of xi and
ai
aj
units of xj , and is thus willing to switch one unit of xi for
ai
aj
or
more units of xj .
This is a special case of a general observation that can be made by considering
a small movement along xi and xj on an indifference curve, so that there is no
total change in utility:
∂u(x)
∂xi
dxi +
∂u(x)
∂xj
dxj = 0⇒ dxj
dxi
= −
∂u(x)
∂xi
∂u(x)
∂xj
(9)
It is common to refer to the absolute value (omitting the minus sign) of this
slope as the rate of substitution between xi and xj .
In the perfect substitutes case, the derivatives in (9) are constant, so it can
be applied also for non-infinitesimal changes to xi and xj . Applying it to the
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exchanging of one unit of xi for
ai
aj
(so that ∆xi = −1, ∆xj = + aiaj ) gives the
following zero change in utility, just a expected:
∂u(x)
∂xi
∆xi +
∂u(x)
∂xj
∆xj = ai(−1) + aj ai
aj
= 0 (10)
For n properties, we can now form a matrix R of rates of substitution
∣∣∣dxjdxi ∣∣∣
from xi to xj , which in the linear utility case are just the following constant
quotients:
R =

a1
a1
a1
a2
· · · a1an
a2
a1
a2
a2
· · · a2an
...
...
. . .
...
an
a1
an
a2
· · · anan

(11)
The fact that the diagonal elements are all equal to unity follows by definition:
one unit of xi is worth precisely one unit of xi, for all i.
The fact that ri,j = 1/rj,i for ri,j ∈ R is also important, as it fixes the value
of one unit of xi. Suppose that we trade one unit of xi for ri,j units of xj , and
then trade the resulting ri,j units of xj back in to xi again: this circular trade
must be on an indifference curve, so u(xi) = u(xiri,jrj,i), as is of the course the
case for all rates in (11).
Expanding this requirement to hold also for longer chains of exchanges, we
see that the following n equations hold for (11):
r1,j
r2,j
...
rn,j
 rj,j+1 =

r1,j+1
r2,j+1
...
rn,j+1
 (12)
In words, each column j of exchange rates (expressing the rates of going from
each of the properties 1, 2, . . . , n to property j) can be turned into the adjacent
column j+ 1 by multiplying with the scalar exchange rate from j to j+ 1,
aj
aj+1
.
This applies to the entire matrix if applied circularly, so that the n:th column
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is turned into the 1st, using rn,1 =
an
a1
. This property also entails a convenient
necessary property of R (noted in AHP context in [19] and [20]):
Theorem 1 (Rank of R). Any R expressing non-circular preferences has rank
1.
Proof. R has non-zero columns, so the rank is positive, but by (12), every pair
of columns is linearly dependent, so the rank is 1.
To make matters more concrete, say that we have elicited linear rates of
substitution between functional suitability (x1), performance efficiency (x2), and
compatibility (x3) for some future software product in some circumstances. The
elicitation results are the following three 3×3 matrices of rates of substitution for
x1 and x2, x1 and x3, and x2 and x3, respectively, with the unknown elements
in each matrix left blank.
Rˆ =

1 23
3
2 1
 R˜ =

1 34
4
3 1
 Rˇ =
 1 45
5
4 1
 (13)
Taken as 2 × 2 matrices they all imply non-circular preferences, as rˆ1,2 =
1/r2,1, r˜1,3 = 1/r3,1, and rˇ2,3 = 1/r3,2. They also complement each other in the
sense that values for the missing elements of each matrix can be found in the
others. However, just na¨ıvely combining these values into a full 3× 3 matrix R′
does not yield a consistent utility function:
R′ =

1 23
3
4
3
2 1
4
5
4
3
5
4 1
 (14)
To see this, we can note that rank(R′) = 3, or just calculate e.g. r′1,2 · r′2,3 =
2
3 · 45 = 815 6= r′1,3 = 34 .
There are several ways to make R′ consistent. If one of the elicited rates
is known to be less certain than the others, or problematic in some other way,
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it is straightforward to re-calculate this particular rate from the others. If all
rates are equally trustworthy, the derivatives of eigenvalues method from [20]
can be applied. However, noting that the rates in R′ are actually quotients of
ai parameters from (1), we can understand the inconsistency in another way,
viz. as inconsistencies in the observations of ai. Specifically, Rˆ implies that
aˆ1 = 2 and aˆ2 = 3, R˜ implies that a˜1 = 3 and a˜3 = 4, and Rˇ implies that aˇ2 = 4
and aˇ3 = 5.
Luckily, this also suggests a family of straight-forward methods for forming
a consistent joint 3 × 3 matrix R, namely combining the different parameter
values into a single (thus consistent) parameter. For example, using arithmetic
means as combination method, we form a consistent a1 simply as follows: a1 =
(aˆ1 + a˜1)/2. In the example, we thus find a consistent matrix R by plugging
a1 = 5/2, a2 = 7/2, and a3 = 9/2 into (11):
R =

1 5/27/2
5/2
9/2
7/2
5/2 1
7/2
9/2
9/2
5/2
9/2
7/2 1

(15)
This matrix corresponds to one single utility function of the form (1). We can
also easily verify that rank(R) = 1.
5.2. The Cobb-Douglas case
Moving on to the Cobb-Douglas case, the rates of substitution between the
properties xi and xj are no longer constant, but vary depending on the magni-
tudes of xi and xj . This also differs from the use of constant weights in AHP.
In particular, properties exhibit diminishing marginal utility, which is very rea-
sonable in many cases: going from 1 to 2 in terms of reliability, say, may well
be worth more than going from 2 to 3. (But again, this may not be the case,
which can be captured by utility functions such as the Leontief or linear one.)
More precisely, to find the rates of substitution between xi and xj , we can
apply (9) to (3), and obtain the following well known result about Cobb-Douglas
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rates of substitution:
ri,j =
∂u(x)
∂xi
∂u(x)
∂xj
=
aix
ai−1
i
∏
k 6=i x
ak
k
ajx
aj−1
j
∏
k 6=j x
ak
k
=
aix
ai−1
i x
aj
j
ajx
aj−1
j x
ai
i
=
aixj
ajxi
(16)
Inspecting (16), we see that as the amount of xj relative to xi grows, the ex-
change rate required for indifference increases, i.e. diminishing marginal utility
of xj .
For these rates to be consistent, again we can form the following condition
that must hold:
ri,k = ri,jrj,k =
aixj
ajxi
ajxk
akxj
=
aixk
akxi
(17)
This means that (12) applies here as well: each column in R can be transformed
into the next by multiplication with a conversion factor, the important difference
being that this exchange rate is not fixed, but depends on the amounts of the
properties involved.
However, (17) is just a necessary condition, not a sufficient one. For even
though (16) simplifies beautifully as a quotient, we need the ∂u(x)∂xi from each
elicitation where property xi is involved to be the same – including, in the Cobb-
Douglas case, the long product conveniently canceled out in (16). The matrix
of rates of substitution is a matrix of functions that must satisfy (9) for any
input argument (i.e. magnitudes of xi). This is one reason why the arithmetic
means method of ensuring consistency is attractive in its simplicity. Methods
such as taking derivatives of the eigenvalues of the matrix are more difficult to
apply in the general case, compared to when the matrix is constant.
5.3. The Leontief case
In the Leontief case, the difficulties identified for linear and Cobb-Douglas
utility in principle still hold. However, due to its particular functional form, it
also exhibits additional difficulties. Applying (9) to (2), we obtain the following
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expression:
∂u(x)
∂xi
dxi +
∂u(x)
∂xj
dxj =
=dxi ·
 ai if aixi = minnk=1{akxk}0 otherwise +
dxj ·
 aj if ajxj = minnk=1{akxk}0 otherwise =
=

dxiai 6= 0 if aixi = minnk=1{akxk}
dxjaj 6= 0 if ajxj = minnk=1{akxk}
0 otherwise
(18)
Putting (18) into simple words: Trade-offs between xi and xj cannot be
made along Leontief indifference curves. If aixi is the smallest of all weighted
properties, then the utility gained by increasing xi cannot be balanced by any
utility lost by decreasing xj because decreasing xj does not decrease utility.
Mutatis mutandis if ajxj is the smallest of all weighted properties. A “trade-
off” can only be made if neither aixi nor ajxj is the smallest of all weighted
properties, meaning that changes in xi and xj do not matter at all for utility.
This is just the perfect complements property expressed formally – Leontief
goods are not substitutable. Forming rates of substitution as quotients of partial
derivatives is revealing: if aixi is the smallest of all weighted properties, then the
exchange rate ri,j =
ai
0 = ∞, and conversely the exchange rate rj,i = 0ai = 0,
because it is never worth trading even an infinitesimal amount of xi even for an
arbitrarily large amount of xj .
Again, to ensure consistency among several pairwise elicited Leontief rates
of substitution, we need to find consistent parameters that determine a unique
instance of (2). As is evident from (18), in the Leontief case consistent param-
eters do not only influence the magnitudes of the partial derivatives, but also
decide which one of them is non-zero. Here, it becomes clear that we cannot
just do this comparison pairwise (as elicited), but that the min function needs
to be applied globally to a vector of properties, consistently weighted, e.g. by
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Figure 4: Screenshot showing alternative elicitation interface, more amenable to be applied
in the higher dimensional case.
taking arithmetic means of the parameters pairwise elicited.
5.4. Enforcing consistency in elicitation
Another strategy for ensuring consistency would be to change the elicitation
model. (4)–(8) can easily be modified to elicit further parameters, in addition
to a1 and a2. However, such an interface might also become less intuitive to
the user, as the two-dimensional graphical depiction of the trade-off (seen in
Fig. 2(a)) could no longer be used. Instead, such an interface would require
values along the property axes (which would be eight, if adhering to ISO/IEC
25010) to be set in some other way. Fig. 4 shows an example of such an interface,
where the property values are entered through sliders rather than mouse clicks
in the two dimensional plane. The number of sliders could easily be expanded
(e.g. to eight) allowing elicitation of consistent preferences that could be fed into
higher dimensional versions of (4)–(8). However, the graphical aid to the right,
depicting the choices made, is not as easy to expand. The problem with such
elicitation is that though it is mathematically convenient, the problem faced by
the user rapidly approaches the kinds of high dimensional vector comparisons
illustrated in Section 1. In other words, this elicitation may be too taxing to
use in practice as it pushes the original problem of vector comparison back to
the decision-maker.
An alternative middle road could be to elicit higher dimensional preferences
using sliders, but also to modify the graphical aid so that the user can use it to
show projections of the higher dimensional locations of the points set onto the
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plane or onto a three dimensional space.
5.5. The case of several models
An implication of the discussion above is that for three properties x1, x2, x3,
we cannot have the trade-offs between 1 and 2, and 2 and 3, respectively to be
of one functional kind (e.g. Cobb-Douglas), but the trade-off between 1 and 3
to be of another (e.g. linear). This is prohibited by (12), which for this example
translates into (17) (with i = 1, j = 2, k = 3) showing that the trade-off between
1 and 3 is also Cobb-Douglas.
However, if one set of properties x1, . . . , xn has a consistent utility function
of one kind, and another set of properties xn+1, . . . , xn+m, has a consistent
utility function of another kind, it is possible to find rates of substitution from
one property of the first kind to another property of the second kind.
Consider first the case of substitution between Cobb-Douglas properties and
linear utility properties. Without loss of generality, assume an ordering such
that the first n properties jointly contribute to a Cobb-Douglas utility function,
and the next m properties jointly contribute to a linear utility function. We
then have a total utility function of the following form:
u(x) =
n∏
i=1
xaii +
n+m∑
j=n+1
ajxj (19)
The rates of substitution between any pair among the first n ones will be ac-
cording to (16), for the derivatives of the sum part of (19) will be zero with
respect to all the first n properties, so (9) holds just as for a pure Cobb-Douglas
utility function. By a symmetric argument, the rates of substitution between
any pair among the next m properties will be the quotients of (11).
To find the rates of substitution between the two sets, we again form quo-
tients of partial derivatives according to (9):
ri,j =
∂u(x)
∂xi
∂u(x)
∂xj
=
aix
ai−1
i
∏n
k∈{1,...,n}\i x
ak
k
aj
(20)
This rate of substitution is not constant, as in the linear case, but exhibits
diminishing marginal utility – the rate goes up as more xi is traded for xj
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(Cobb-Douglas parameters ai are typically less than unity, so x
ai−1
i grows as
xi decreases). However, as opposed to the diminishing marginal utility of the
Cobb-Douglas rate, (20) is independent of xj . This is expected – a unit of xj
is always worth aj , no matter how many one already has, according to (19).
Rather the whole effect comes from each unit of xi becoming more valuable as
the level of xi decreases.
Moving on to the case of substitution between Cobb-Douglas utility prop-
erties and Leontief utility properties, using ordering as above, we have a total
utility function of the following form:
u(x) =
n∏
i=1
xaii +
n+m
min
j=n+1
ajxj (21)
To find the rates of substitution between these two sets, we again form quotients
of partial derivatives according to (9). But the numerator is the same as the
numerator in (20), and the denominator is either aj , if ajxj = min
n+m
k=n+1{akxk},
or zero. So the rates of substitution between Cobb-Douglas utility properties
and Leontief utility properties is either the same as that between Cobb-Douglas
utility properties and linear utility properties, i.e. (20), or infinite. This is
reasonable, as the Leontief utility either grows linearly in xj , or not at all.
Finally considering the case of substitution between linear utility properties
and Leontief utility properties, using ordering as above, we have a total utility
function of the following form:
u(x) =
n∑
i=1
aixi +
n+m
min
j=n+1
ajxj (22)
Again forming quotients of partial derivatives according to (9), we find rates
of substitution that are either the same as that between linear utility properties,
i.e. ri,j =
ai
aj
if ajxj = min
n+m
k=n+1{akxk}, or infinite.
6. Grand unifying example
The scene is now all set for a grand unifying example, exhibiting the full
power of the framework devised in the preceding sections. Suppose that we face
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trade-offs between the eight non-functional properties from ISO/IEC 25010.
Using the elicitation framework described in Section 4, we can find trade-offs
between pairs of properties.
Let us say that we have elicited a Cobb-Douglas utility function for proper-
ties x1, x2, x3, a linear utility function for properties x4, x5, x6, and a Leontief
utility function for properties x7, x8. Each of these have been made consistent
for instance by forming means of parameters from each pairwise elicitation, as
described in Section 5. We thus have three matrices of rates of substitution –
R123, R456, and R78. Based on the discussion in Section 5.5, we can now form
a grand total 8× 8 matrix of rates of substitution, seen in (23).
R =

1 a1x2a2x1
a1x3
a3x1
a1x
a1−1
1 x
a2
2 x
a3
3
a4
a1x
a1−1
1 x
a2
2 x
a3
3
a5
a1x
a1−1
1 x
a2
2 x
a3
3
a6

a1x
a1−1
1 x
a2
2 x
a3
3
a7
∞

a1x
a1−1
1 x
a2
2 x
a3
3
a8
∞
a2x1
a1x2
1 a2x3a3x2
a2x
a2−1
2 x
a1
1 x
a3
3
a4
a2x
a2−1
2 x
a1
1 x
a3
3
a5
a2x
a2−1
2 x
a1
1 x
a3
3
a6

a2x
a2−1
2 x
a1
1 x
a3
3
a7
∞

a2x
a2−1
2 x
a1
1 x
a3
3
a8
∞
a3x1
a1x3
a3x2
a2x3
1
a3x
a3−1
3 x
a1
1 x
a2
2
a4
a3x
a3−1
3 x
a1
1 x
a2
2
a5
a3x
a3−1
3 x
a1
1 x
a2
2
a6

a3x
a3−1
3 x
a2
2 x
a1
1
a7
∞

a3x
a3−1
3 x
a2
2 x
a1
1
a8
∞
1 a4a5
a4
a6
 a4a7∞
 a4a8∞
a5
a4
1 a5a6
 a5a7∞
 a5a8∞
a6
a4
a6
a5
1
 a6a7∞
 a6a8∞
1
 ∞ if a7x7 < a8x80 otherwise 0 if a7x7 < a8x8∞ otherwise 1

(23)
The blocks along the diagonal are just the three matrices R123, R456, and
R78 from the elicitation. The subdiagonal blocks are omitted for convenience
– we know already that ri,j = 1/rj,i. The superdiagonal blocks are formed as
described in Section 5.5 – showing rates of substitution between Cobb-Douglas
and linear (rows 1 − 3 × columns 4 − 6), between Cobb-Douglas and Leontief
(rows 1 − 3 × columns 7 − 8), and between linear and Leontief (rows 4 − 6 ×
columns 7 − 8). Whenever trade-offs are made with the Leontief properties x7
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and x8, rates will be ∞ when the denominator is 0 (and conversely, rates will
be 0 when the numerator is 0 on the subdiagonal).
Two things are worth noticing about the matrix in (23). First, with the
exception of the linear trade-offs in the very middle, the values are not fixed,
but functions of the values in the vector x. This also means that trade-offs
made according to any particular rate are in general only valid for infinitesimal
changes dxi and dxj . For larger changes ∆xi and ∆xj , the rates found at the
initial values x0 are linear approximations. Second, (12) holds for R in (23).
(23) implies a utility function with three components – the sum of a Cobb-
Douglas, a linear, and a Leontief utility function. Given the parameters a1, . . . , a8,
we are now in a position to answer the question posed in the introduction: Which
of the alternatives A, B, or C should be preferred?
Assuming, for the sake of the example, that the elicitation gave a = (0.5,
0.3, 0.2, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6), we find u(A) = 83.25, u(B) = 86.86, and u(C) = 44.29, so
under these preferences B turns out to be the best. The numbers of the example
are arbitrary, of course, but the trade-off method illustrated is not.
7. Empirical results
In order to test the conceptual ideas outlined above, we conducted a set of
exploratory preference elicitations. While these cannot be considered proper
experiments, they nevertheless gave some interesting results, including insights
that are relevant for future rigorous experiments. This section outlines the elic-
itation instrument and setup, the various pilot elicitations, and the two mature
elicitations finally conducted.
7.1. Elicitation instrument and setup
Based on the interface idea shown in Fig. 2(a), an actual elicitation instru-
ment was constructed. The method used was an idea originally proposed in
the discussion of the conference article, viz. to start from an existing product
with known non-functional properties, employing it as a baseline. Stake-holders
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would then be asked to identify their indifference curves in regions corresponding
to small perturbations in those properties.
For this idea to be feasible, suitable non-functional properties had to be
identified. These properties would need to meet three important requirements:
(i) being known (to a reasonable precision) for the baseline product, and (ii) be-
ing measurable on a numeric scale, preferably a ratio scale, and (iii) there being
at least three properties in the chosen set, to allow for analysis of consistency as
described in Section 5. Though initially discussed, the idea of letting the sub-
jects themselves select the non-functional properties was discarded, as it seemed
to entail a high risk of not meeting criterion (ii). Criterion (iii), in practice, be-
came an exact number rather than a lower bound, to avoid unnecessarily taxing
elicitation. In the end, the following three properties were selected and fixed for
use in all the elicitations:
Mean Time to Failure (MTTF): This is the time it takes, on average, be-
fore the service fails and becomes unavailable. Example: 83 days.
Mean Time to Restore (MTTR): This is the time it takes, on average, to
get the service available again after a failure. Example: 3 hours.
Mean development time for a new feature: This is the time it takes, on
average, to implement, test, and commit a new feature in the service.
Example: 14 days.
The definitions and examples given above were the ones given to the subjects
when introducing the elicitation.
With these properties fixed, an elicitation instrument was built. Google
sheets, rather than the Matlab based instrument described in Section 4, were
used in order to allow (i) simple data collection from several users, (ii) at the
same time, without (iii) any need to install separate software on the computers of
subjects, while (iv) still allowing competent management and display of numeric
results. The computational machinery required to solve Eqs. 4, 5, and 6-8 was
not implemented in Google sheets, however, as the estimated utility functions
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did not have to be displayed in real time to the subjects in the elicitations
conducted.
The interface is shown in Fig. 5. It allows elicitation of the three pairwise
trade-offs (i) MTTF vs. MTTR, (ii) MTTF vs. Mean development time, and
(iii) MTTR vs. Mean development time. In each case, four hypothetical al-
ternatives – characterized by their property values – are elicited, forming an
indifference curve together with the baseline original property values. The re-
sulting indifference curve is displayed on the right-hand side, as the numbers
are entered.
At the bottom of the elicitation instrument, subjects were also asked to follow
a URL to fill out a short feedback form evaluating the task and the elicitation
process. It contained the following substantial questions:
1. How interesting did you find the task? (5 point Likert scale)
2. How clear did you find the task? (5 point Likert scale)
3. How relevant and helpful do you think the graphical representation was
for solving the task? (5 point Likert scale)
4. What is your main take away (or understanding) from the task? (Free
text)
5. Additional feedback or comments (Free text)
Subjects could choose to answer this form anonymously, so that their elicited
preferences and their feedback could not be matched, or allow the two to be
identified via a pseudonym (still maintaining anonymity with regard to their
real names).
The overall setup proceeded as follows. The subjects were given a short
introduction to trade-offs by the elicitation leader. The presentation emphasized
that trade-offs are everywhere in engineering, and that most of the time there
are no obvious ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ solutions. Whenever alternatives with vectors
of properties do not dominate each other, non-trivial trade-offs have to be made.
Next, the three properties MTTF, MTTR, and Mean development time were
introduced, as above. Once these properties had been introduced, the first task
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Figure 5: Screenshot showing elicitation of alternatives with the same utility. For each of the
three pair-wise trade-offs, property values of four hypothetical alternatives are entered below
the baseline, bolded, showing the actual property values. As the hypotheticals are entered,
the diagrams to the right are populated, showing the points on the indifference curves as they
are entered.
was to find the baseline to be used. Subjects were asked, collectively, to think of
an IT service that they use, and then discuss and agree upon numeric values for
the three properties. The elicitation leader moderated the discussion as needed,
and also entered the resulting figures into the Google sheet based elicitation
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instrument.
Once subjects had agreed on the baseline, their task was introduced in
greater detail. It was explained that the aim was to investigate trade-offs by
eliciting four hypothetical alternative services, assessed to be equally good as
the baseline. To do this, while avoiding introducing any bias with regard to the
particular properties at hand, a non-IT example was used. Subjects were asked
to consider a baseline hotel with properties a two element property vector (cost
= 100 e/night, distance from city center = 2 km). Against this baseline, the
following examples of equally good hypotheticals were given:
• (cost = 120 e/night, distance = 1 km)
• (cost = 180 e/night, distance = 0.5 km)
• (cost = 70 e/night, distance = 5 km)
• (cost = 50 e/night, distance = 10 km)
It was explained that eliciting these alternatives would allow the construction of
a so called indifference curve. It was also stressed that subjects should not think
of the technical feasibility of their hypotheticals – the focus of the elicitation is
not on feasibility but on preferences. Despite this, of course, it is still possible
that some subjects were constrained in the elicitation by their self-perceived
knowledge of feasible engineering choices. Finally, it was emphasized that there
are no right or wrong answers, and that the trade-offs are context dependent.
Subjects were asked to take the task seriously and do their best to make sensible
trade-offs in their own context.
At this stage, the URL to the elicitation instrument was distributed to the
subjects, who could then start filling out their data.
7.2. Pilot elicitations
In order to test the elicitation instrument before using it for real, two pilot
elicitations were conducted. The first pilot round was less formal, using the
Google sheets based instrument only, omitting the presentation and guiding by
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the elicitation leader. The test subjects were colleagues of the authors, i.e. re-
searchers with PhDs in computer science or information systems. Out of three
invited colleagues, two completed the form. In this pilot, there was no fixed IT
service for the subjects to consider, but they were rather allowed to make some-
thing up themselves. Explicit feedback included the need for more instructions
to participants (which in part prompted the development of the presentation and
guidance by the elicitation leader), the need to provide explicit definitions of the
three properties, and the need to highlight the baseline values, so that subjects
would not overwrite them. An implicit lesson learned from the results rather
than the subject feedback was that the third trade-off was challenging to sub-
jects. Both pilot subjects in fact offered a series of hypotheticals that dominate
each other, as seen in Fig. 6(a), rather than hypotheticals that could reasonably
form an indifference curve. Such a systematically spurious result could possibly
be attributed to poor understanding among subjects of the properties, i.e. what
constitutes better or worse MTTF, MTTR, and Mean development time.
The second pilot round included the full setup, including the presentation
and guiding by the elicitation leader. The test subjects were students in com-
puter science recruited by the authors, one undergraduate and one graduate
student. As opposed to the first pilot, subjects were asked to think of real IT
services, but the two subjects did not have to think of the same service. Another
change from the first pilot was that the questionnaire evaluating the task and
the elicitation process was tested for the first time. These answers revealed that
subjects found the task both interesting and clear (average of 4 on 5 point Likert
scale), and also that the graphical representation in the diagrams was relevant
and helpful for solving the task (average of 4 on 5 point Likert scale). One of
the pilot subjects expressed it as follows: “The graphical representation was
very useful. Without it, the task might seem a bit too abstract.” The second
pilot also confirmed that the third trade-off is challenging to subjects, as these
two subjects also offered series of hypotheticals that dominate each other.
Having thus tested and improved the elicitation instrument and setup in
the pilots, two actual elicitations with two quite different sets of subjects were
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(a) A systematically spurious indifference
curve.
(b) A more random spurious indifference
curve.
Figure 6: Examples of spurious elicitation results (from elicitation 1), where some hypotheti-
cals dominate others in a systematic or more random way.
conducted, described in Sections 7.3, and 7.4, respectively.
In addition to these two, a third elicitation was attempted with subjects
being colleagues of the authors, working on an automotive software development
research project [21], which has previously been suitable for research activities
[22]. However, when elicitation was attempted, it became evident that it was
very difficult to get a common idea of a suitable IT service, the properties of
which to reason about. In this respect, a research project where the service is
constantly being re-developed and re-defined turned out to be ill-suited.
7.3. Elicitation 1: University course
The first set of subjects were a class of university students in their final year
towards the bachelor’s degree, now taking a specialization course in Enterprise
Architecture, and the professor teaching the course. The first author gave a
guest lecture in their course, before moving on to present the elicitation task.
In this elicitation, a suitable IT service known and used by the students had
been identified beforehand: the Student Information Systems (StISys), used to
sign up for exams and labs, as well as to access examination results. Once the
three properties had been introduced, the first elicitation took place, collectively,
by discussing and agreeing upon numeric values for the properties. In accor-
dance with the procedure described above, the elicitation leader moderated the
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discussion, eventually arriving at a baseline of 225 days of MTTF, 2 hours of
MTTR, and 10 days of Mean development time for a new feature. These figures
do not necessarily correspond to the ground truth as might be found e.g. from
logs, but they do constitute a valid baseline to elicit preferences. For the devel-
opment time, the presence of the professor was instrumental in getting a good
estimate, as the students only have a limited perception of the new features
introduced in the service.
In total, 8 participants filled out the elicitation instrument. Out of these,
one participant only stated one of the three requested trade-offs, resulting in
22 distinct elicited indifference curves. Out of these, 14 were reasonable in
the weak sense of not containing any dominating/dominated hypotheticals on
the indifference curve, whereas the remaining 8 did contain such hypotheticals.
Two typical examples (from elicitation 1) are shown in Fig. 6. As noted above,
systematically spurious results (but not seemingly random spuriousness) could
possibly be attributed to poor understanding among subjects of the properties,
i.e. what constitutes better or worse MTTF, MTTR, and Mean development
time. As seen in Fig. 2(a), the elicitation instrument was built to help subjects
in this respect, by inverting the axes for properties where a smaller value is
better, so that better alternatives are always graphically depicted to the right
and/or above worse alternatives. However, it is clear that this mechanism is not
sufficient to prevent systematically spurious preferences.
Fig. 7 gives an overview of the elicitation results with the individual re-
sponses exhibiting dominating/dominated hypotheticals removed. Note that
here again axis directions correspond to the convention that moving to the
right or up is better (as illustrated in Fig. 1), i.e. the axis directions for MTTR
and Dev. time have been reversed, as these properties are better the smaller
they are.
In each of the plots in Fig. 7, the elicited hypotheticals of a particular sub-
ject are shown using a unique marker, e.g. hypotheticals from one subject are
shown as , hypotheticals from another as ×. When hypotheticals from several
subjects coincide, the markers are superimposed (and thus, unfortunately, not
29
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
MTTF (days)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
M
TT
R
 (h
ou
rs)
Trade-off
(a) The MTTF/MTTR trade-off, showing 6
responses (2 removed).
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
MTTF (days)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
D
ev
. t
im
e 
(da
ys
)
Trade-off
(b) The MTTF/Dev. time trade-off, showing
6 responses (2 removed).
0123456
MTTR (hours)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
D
ev
. t
im
e 
(da
ys
)
Trade-off
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Figure 7: Elicitation results from the university course. The baseline is (MTTF= 225 days,
MTTR= 2 hours, Dev. time= 10 days). In each case, a boundary plot (blue, dashed) encom-
passes all elicited hypotheticals to give a rough visual indication of how the set of indifference
curves looks.
very legible). The baseline, of course, can be seen as the superimposition of all
the markers.
Two interesting observations can immediately be made. First, as is to be
expected, subjects do not agree. For example, as seen in Fig. 7(a), three dif-
ferent subjects (×,+,) put hypotheticals × =(MTTF = 100, MTTR = 1),
30
+ =(MTTF = 125, MTTR = 1), and  =(MTTF = 180, MTTR = 1) on the
same indifference curve as the baseline (MTTF = 225, MTTR = 2). But these
three hypotheticals cannot all be on a non-Leontief indifference curve, since they
all share the same MTTR but differ in MTTF. Such spans in preferences are
illustrated, roughly, by the boundary plots encompassing all the elicited hypo-
theticals for each trade-off. A tight boundary plot indicates more agreement – a
wider boundary plot indicates less agreement. Of course, as argued in Section 4,
disagreement between subjects can be resolved using least squares solutions of
utility functions, but it should also be noted that it can be dangerous to apply
this approach mechanically. This will be further discussed in Section 8.
The second observation relates precisely to this. Looking at Fig. 7(c), it is
relatively clear that the collective indifference curve is not linear, but exhibits
a curvature. However, it is concave rather than convex, like the Cobb-Douglas
utility depicted in Fig. 1(c). Na¨ıvely solving (5) gives a solution, a1 = 1.71 > 0,
b1 = 1.54 > 0, where increasing MTTR and increasing development time yields
higher utility. In other words, the directions – what is good and what is bad
– for both properties have been confused. This is a drawback of the elicitation
method outlined in Section 4.1, and the elicitation instrument employed in the
empirical study. Using the method outlined in Section 4.2 instead would solve
this particular problem, but only at the cost of requiring the subject to specify
cardinal utilities, as opposed to mere ordinal ones. Though this might be feasible
in some cases, it would often impose unreasonable requirements on the subjects.
7.3.1. Subject feedback
Turning to the feedback form answered by subjects after the elicitation was
complete, 7 out of the 8 subjects completed it. The quantitative results are
given in Table 1. It is evident that most subjects found the task both inter-
esting and clear. Opinions are more diverse on the usefulness of the graphical
representation, i.e. the diagrams seen to the right in Fig. 5. As only 3 subjects
had allowed their elicited preferences and their feedback to be matched, it is
difficult to say anything specific about the relation between the perceived use-
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Table 1: Quantitative subject feedback, on 5 point Likert scale, from elicitation 1.
Question: How interest-
ing did you
find the task?
How clear
did you find
the task?
How relevant and helpful do you
think the graphical representa-
tion was for solving the task?
4 5 2
5 4 4
5 3 2
5 4 5
3 5 5
5 5 5
5 4 4
Mean: 4.57 4.29 3.86
Median: 5 4 4
fulness of the graphical representation and the quality of the results in terms of
existence of dominating/dominated hypotheticals on the indifference curve. The
data that is available is mixed indeed – two subjects ranking the usefulness of
the graphical representation as 5 and 2, respectively, both gave only dominance
free indifference curves, whereas 1 subject who also ranked the usefulness of the
graphical representation as 2, gave two dominance free indifference curves and
one with systematically dominating/dominated hypotheticals.
As for the free text questions in the feedback form, the main take aways of
the subjects in general were reasonable and thoughtful, focusing on the necessity
of trade-offs, that every person might exhibit individual trade-offs, and the fact
that some properties are more important than others, but that translating this
into a numeric value is more difficult. One subject also commented on linear
(Fig. 1(a)) vs. curved indifference curves, saying that the latter might be more
realistic.
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7.4. Elicitation 2: Integration service provider
The second set of subjects were two employees of a commercial integration
service provider. One subject had a role in sales, the other in technology.
In this elicitation, the IT service had not been decided upon beforehand.
However, the subjects very quickly agreed that the most suitable service was the
integration platform that constitutes the core business of the company, i.e. pro-
cessing and transferring information, on behalf of customers, between various
applications. Once the three properties had been introduced, the first elicitation
took place, collectively, by discussing and agreeing upon numeric values for the
properties. In accordance with the procedure described above, the elicitation
leader moderated the discussion, eventually arriving at a baseline of 500 days
of MTTF, 1.36 hours of MTTR, and 20 days of Mean development time for a
new feature. In this case, these figures should be regarded as having reasonably
high precision, though it should be remembered that as mean values, they can
serve only as a rough characterization of the full underlying distributions. The
subject with the technology role was instrumental in achieving high precision
in the estimates.
Both subjects fully completed the elicitation instrument. There were no
dominating/dominated hypotheticals on the indifference curves.
Fig. 8 gives an overview of the elicitation results. As no individual re-
sponses exhibited dominating/dominated hypotheticals, nothing has been re-
moved. Axis directions and unique markers per subject are as before.
Similar observations can be made as in the case of the university course.
Again, as is to be expected, subjects do not agree. This is particularly evident
in the cases of greater MTTF values. For example, as seen in Fig. 8(a), the
two different subjects (◦,+) put hypotheticals + =(MTTF = 800, MTTR = 3),
◦ =(MTTF = 2000, MTTR = 3) on the same indifference curve as the baseline
(MTTF = 500, MTTR = 1.36). But these two hypotheticals cannot both be on
a non-Leontief indifference curve, since they both share the same MTTR but
differ in MTTF. The same tendency is seen in Fig. 8(b), where hypotheticals
+ =(MTTF = 800, Dev. time = 40), ◦ =(MTTF = 2 000, Dev. time = 40) were
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Figure 8: Elicitation results from the integration service provider. The baseline is (MTTF=
500 days, MTTR= 1.36 hours, Dev. time= 20 days). In each case, a boundary plot (blue,
dashed) encompasses all elicited hypotheticals to give a rough visual indication of how the set
of indifference curves looks.
put on the same indifference curve as the baseline (MTTF = 500, Dev. time =
20). The MTTF issue will be further discussed in Section 8.
The second observation can also be made again: looking at Fig. 8(c), it is
relatively clear that the collective indifference curve is not linear, but exhibits
a concave curvature. (The boundary plot is visually misleading here, as there
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are no actual hypotethicals between the boundaries of the long line segment
connecting MTTR = 6 with MTTR = 1. A better boundary would have passed
the + =(MTTR = 3, Dev. time = 13) point as well.) Again, solving (5) gives
a solution, a1 = 0.66 > 0, b1 = 1.56 > 0, where increasing MTTR and increas-
ing development time yields higher utility. The concavity issue will be further
discussed in Section 8.
However, a third, important, observation can also be made. The subjects in
this elicitation did not exhibit any dominating/dominated hypotheticals. With
just two subjects, it cannot be ruled out that this is a mere coincidence, but
it does not seem like an unreasonable hypothesis to believe that this is due
to a better understanding of the IT service which is the core business of the
subjects to develop and sell, compared to the students in elicitation 1, who are
mere users and customers, and can have preferences that are not necessarily
well founded. One of the subjects explicitly stated this hypothesis after the
elicitation, noting that “To us, this is not just an abstraction”, when being
told about the prevalence of dominating/dominated hypotheticals among the
student subjects. (Of course, the credibility of the hypothesis is not substantially
strengthened by such a remark that might obviously be subject to self-serving
bias.)
7.4.1. Subject feedback
Table 2: Quantitative subject feedback, on 5 point Likert scale, from elicitation 2.
Question: How interest-
ing did you
find the task?
How clear
did you find
the task?
How relevant and helpful do you
think the graphical representa-
tion was for solving the task?
5 4 5
3 5 3
Mean =
Median: 4 4.5 4
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Turning to the feedback form answered by subjects after the elicitation was
complete, both subjects completed it. The quantitative results are given in
Table 2. It is clear that subjects were reasonably happy with the task and the
graphical representation. Just a single free text comment was submitted, noting
that some trade-offs are more easy or evident than others.
8. Discussion
The preceding sections have discussed how to elicit preferences with regard
to non-functional properties (Section 4), how to ensure the consistency of these
preferences (Section 5), and how the results of such elicitations might look like
in practice (Section 7). The GUI and mathematical apparatus allow relatively
powerful utility models to be built from relatively straight-forward user input.
These utility models, in turn, offer solutions to the trade-off problem introduced
in Section 1. However, there are also limitations, to be discussed in the following.
8.1. The limits of automatic identification of utility functions
In the original conference article, it was argued that the use of least squares
solutions is a strength of the method proposed, as it allows for letting many
stake-holders enter data independently, and then construct the utility function
based on all inputs. This might be a way to get rid of some individual biases
in order to construct collectively valid utility models. Based on the empirical
results in Section 7, this vision must be complemented with a few more caveats.
First, the prevalence of dominating/dominated hypotheticals, illustrated in
Fig. 6, shows a need to either (i) disregard some subject input completely (as
was the case in the rest of the analysis in Section 7), or, preferably, (ii) to capture
spurious results during elicitation and thereby force the subject to revise those
preferences.
Second, the choice of proper utility functions is probably more important
than foreseen in the original conference article. In particular, the elicitations
described in Section 7 highlighted the risk of misidentifying the directions of
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what is good and what is bad for the properties involved. Thus, there seems to
be a need for more tailoring and application of specifically suitable utility func-
tions for various properties, rather than just generic ones like those introduced
in Section 3. Sections 8.2 and 8.3 therefore discuss the question of specifically
suitable utility functions further along two different lines.
8.2. Concave utility curves
The observation that Figs. 7(c) (in particular) and 8(c) look concave mer-
its us revisiting the discussion in the original conference article about utility
functions as opposed to production functions.
Each of the three functions introduced in Section 3 can also be interpreted as
a production function. Whereas a utility function is designed to model prefer-
ences over bundles of goods, with level curves corresponding to a decision-maker
being indifferent between bundles, a production function is designed to model
output from combinations of inputs, with level curves corresponding to the same
amount of output from combinations of input.
In the case of production functions, there are good arguments why they are
often convex, or more precisely, why their input requirement sets (the set of
input goods x from which it is feasible to produce output good y) are often
convex [16]. One is the replication argument. If there are two technologies
available which can produce y from different input vectors x1 and x2, then to
produce 100y, we could do it either with 100x1 or with 100x2. But, crucially,
we could also do it by applying technology 1 to 50x1 and technology 2 to 50x2.
Taking this argument to its limit, we could produce 100y by any combination
of 100tx1 and 100(1− t)x2 for t ∈ [0, 1]. This is precisely convexity of the input
requirement set. There is also a temporal version of the replication argument,
where output y is considered per time (e.g. per month), and fractional use of
technologies 1 and 2 means using the one during the first part of the month
and the other during the second part of the month. If this is feasible, and
switching costs are negligible, then again this translates into convexity of the
input requirement set. Clearly, both versions of the argument depends on scale –
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for a small production operation, the discreteness of inputs makes the replication
argument less convincing. It is not always meaningful to speak of fractions of
production machines, trucks or people.
These arguments do not necessarily hold for utility functions. Nevertheless,
concave preferences are typically considered relatively unrealistic for ordinary
goods [23]. In the context of non-functional properties, the replication argu-
ment is much less credible. First, the number of feasible technological solutions
is likely to be relatively small, so that their discreteness becomes important.
Second, in the temporal version, it seems unreasonable to assume that switch-
ing costs are negligible.
However, and most importantly, non-functional properties are not ordinary
goods. The MTTF, MTTR, and Mean development time of a piece of soft-
ware cannot be consumed independently. They come together – in this sense,
they are not a bundle of goods, but rather aspects of a single good. Whereas
it is in principle fully possible to buy any amount of a factor input such as
machinery and try to combine it with any amount of another factor input like
manpower for production, combinations of non-functional properties in soft-
ware are much more constrained and intertwined. As a corollary, whereas with
traditional production functions the prices on the factor inputs can be used
to determine economically optimal combinations, this is not feasible with non-
functional properties. Security cannot be purchased at a particular price per
unit, to be combined with performance efficiency purchased at another price per
unit and maintainability purchased at a third price. The observation that non-
functional properties are not ordinary goods sets the stage for the next section,
where we discuss some theoretical and practical aspects of trade-offs between
such properties.
8.3. Trade-offs between non-functional properties
As opposed to factor inputs, which can be freely combined, non-functional
properties are aspects of a single good. Feasible designs, giving rise to feasible
combinations of non-functional properties, are generated in a design process.
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These product alternatives are based on what is deemed feasible from the engi-
neering perspective, and these are the points to be evaluated using the utility
functions. As remarked by one of the referees, it is important to make the
distinction between preferences on the one hand, and feasible designs on the
other. The preferences need not be constrained by what is deemed technologi-
cally feasible at the time, whereas this is precisely the role of designs. This is
illustrated by the hotel example in Section 7.1 – a utility curve can be found
from hypothetical alternatives even if there are no real hotels corresponding
to those alternatives. New technology (or new zoning laws, regulations of real
estate investment, etc., in the example) could make such alternatives feasible
in the future. Therefore, it is prudent to elicit such preferences beforehand,
and allow such preferences to be based also on non-technically feasible alterna-
tives. Thus, the goal is to first elicit these utility functions, and subsequently
use them to evaluate different design alternatives. Indeed, if users supply their
preferences at an early stage in the life cycle of the would be product, then not
only are the alternatives for which they do so hypothetical, but it might also be
unknown where, precisely, the border between feasible and infeasible technical
solutions is located. This will become (approximately) known only as part of
the more elaborate design and engineering work that takes place over the course
of the product development. Nevertheless, the preferences expressed in a utility
curve can be very useful to guide this product development towards interesting
(abstract) regions in the solution space for exploration. Conversely, it can also
guide the product development away from solutions that do not correspond user
preferences.
To further improve our understanding of trade-offs between non-functional
properties, it is useful to consider the elicited MTTF-MTTR trade-offs in greater
detail, as graphically illustrated in Figs. 7(a) and 8(a). The reason is that there is
a natural candidate for a utility function here, viz. the availability resulting from
particular combination of MTTF and MTTR. More specifically, the steady state
availability can be computed as MTTF divided by the total time of operation,
39
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
MTTF (days)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
M
TT
R
 (h
ou
rs)
Availability utility model,u=MTTF/(MTTF+MTTR)
0.9993
0.9995
0.9996
0.9997
0.9998
0.9999
Constant availability curves
(a) Elicitation 1: University course.
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
MTTF (days)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
M
TT
R
 (h
ou
rs)
Availability utility model,u=MTTF/(MTTF+MTTR)
0.99983
0.99984
0.99988
0.99989
0.9999
0.99992
0.99994
0.99996
Constant availability curves
(b) Elicitation 2: Integration service provider.
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which consists of MTTF plus MTTR:
u(MTTF,MTTFR) =
MTTF
MTTF + MTTR
(23)
The result is a fraction, which approaches 100% availability in the limit where
MTTF → ∞ (failures never occur) or MTTR → 0 (failures are immediately
restored). In practice, of course, availability never reaches 100%, but is often
measured as the number of ‘nines’, such as four (99.99 %), five (99.999 %), or
six (99.9999 %).
It is illuminating to plot the elicited MTTF-MTTR trade-offs together with
this utility function as seen in Fig. 9(a) for elicitation 1, and Fig. 9(b) for
elicitation 2.
We noted above that inter-subjects disagreement is particularly evident in
the cases of greater MTTF values. The availability plots put this observation
into perspective. If availability is the relevant utility, it becomes clear that
whether a difference in MTTF or MTTR values should be seen as large or small
is highly dependent on the actual values of those properties. Graphically, this is
reflected in the closeness of the availability levels in the upper left corner: when
both MTTF and MTTR are small, small changes in their values have a large
impact on availability. Conversely, towards the lower right corner, availability
levels are further apart, so that larger changes in the MTTF and MTTR values
are required to have the same impact on availability, i.e. to ‘jump’ from one
availability level curve to the next.
Mathematically, we can describe this by applying (9), as before, to (23):
∂u
∂MTTF
=
MTTR
(MTTF + MTTR)2
(24)
∂u
∂MTTR
= − MTTF
(MTTF + MTTR)2
(25)
dMTTR
dMTTF
= −
∂u
∂MTTF
∂u
∂MTTR
=
MTTR
MTTF
(26)
(26) gives the rate of substitution between MTTR and MTTF, under the as-
sumption that availability is the relevant utility. Applying it, for example, in
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the lower right corner of Fig. 8(a), where MTTF= 2 000 days and MTTR= 3
hours we find that the infinitesimal rate of substitution from MTTF to MTTR is
just 3/(24 · 2 000) = 1/16 000. Conversely, the infinitesimal rate of substitution
from MTTR to MTTF is 16 000.
To take a concrete, non-infinitesimal example, going from where MTTF=
800 days to MTTF= 2 000 days while holding MTTR fixed at 3 hours (i.e. the
large discrepancy at the bottom of the graph) increases availability from 99.984%
to 99.994%. But moving between these availability levels at the baseline MTTR
of 1.36 hours corresponds to a move from MTTF= 363 days to MTTF= 907
days. At the very small MTTR of 0.1 hours (6 minutes) which both subjects
used as a hypothetical, moving between the same availability levels corresponds
to a move from MTTF= 27 days to MTTF= 67 days. This move of 40 days
is actually smaller than the actual discrepancy between subjects recorded at
MTTR = 0.1 hours, where one subject set MTTF= 50 days and the other set
MTTF= 100 days (as illustrated in the upper left corner of Fig. 8(a)).
Thus, if availability is the relevant utility, inter-subject agreement is not
worse for greater MTTF values than for smaller ones. The graphical depiction
with the boundary plot seen in Fig. 8(a) is in this sense a bit misleading, since
MTTF exhibits so steeply diminishing returns in terms of availability, as seen
in (24).
But is availability the relevant utility? The preceding reasoning uses that
assumption as an illuminating starting point, but that does not make it true.
On the contrary, there is reason to believe that true utilities of combinations
of MTTF and MTTR exhibit some deviations from the strict availability per-
spective. This is empirically indicated in Figs. 7(a) and 8(a), where subjects
apparently have deemed hypotheticals on different availability levels equally
good. However, as argued in [24], it is also theoretically justified if the costs of
downtime are not always the same, or if costs depend on outage duration, or if
there is a fixed cost for every outage. For example, 99.9% availability 24 hours a
day, 7 days a week, means almost 9 hours of annual downtime. If all downtime
costs the same, availability might be the relevant utility. But if the costs of
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downtime vary, as is the case e.g. for downtime in a retail payment system, 100
separate 5 minute outages might be preferable to a single 9 hour outage, be-
cause it evens out the costs and limits the risk of a long outage at a critical time,
such as sales just before Christmas. Conversely, if the IT service in question
controls a physical industrial process such as a paper mill, then every outage,
no matter how short it is, comes with a significant cost, and the single 9 hour
outage might be the preferable. Thus, for a given availability level, different
combinations of MTTF and MTTR could be preferred by different stakehold-
ers in different contexts, meaning that the equation of utility with availability
is overly simplistic. Nevertheless, availability could serve as a starting point
for an appropriate utility function, to be modified as diverging preferences are
revealed.
However, it is not always the case that deviations from the utility equals
availability baseline are systematic and consistent. Franke and Buschle used an
experimental economics approach to investigate preferences for different hypo-
thetical availability service level agreements among enterprise IT professionals
[25]. They found a surprising number of non-monotonic preferences, i.e. choices
that could not straightforwardly be explained by systematic deviations from an
expected value maximizing behavior in a risk-seeking or risk-averse direction.
Such preferences are challenging to capture and model descriptively, but also
offer an opportunity for prescriptive corrections as part of an elicitation system,
where unreasonable preferences can be weeded out already as the user enters
them.
To summarize the preceding discussion, it is clear that it is challenging to find
appropriate utility functions for products with different sets of non-functional
properties. Even in a seemingly straightforward case such as the MTTF-MTTR
trade-off, with a strong theoretical candidate for a utility function, unexpected
difficulties turn out. Nevertheless, considering more trade-offs, and explicitly
cataloging utility function candidates along with their strengths and weaknesses
is expected to be rewarding in terms of new insights.
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9. Conclusion and future work
This paper shows a first attempt to employ elicitation of utility functions
with regard to non-functional properties of software components from stake-
holders. Feasibility and usability of the approach has been demonstrated by
two exploratory elicitations conducted on students and practitioners. Based on
these elicitations, the following empirical claims can, tentatively, be made:
Dominating/dominated hypotheticals: Many subjects exhibit preferences
that, taken at face value, are not consistent. This calls for more elaborate
tool support to capture spurious preferences as they are entered, guiding
users towards consistent preferences.
Utility functions: It is not clear that standard utility functions (such as the
linear, Cobb-Douglas, and Leontief functions investigated here) are always
sufficient to properly describe utility functions of non-functional proper-
ties. This is theoretically reasonable as non-functional properties are not
ordinary goods, and the empirical observation that some utility functions
elicited are concave lends some support to this conclusion. However, it
must be stressed that this warrants further empirical research. From a
theoretical point of view, property-specific utility functions such as steady
state availability, might be better suited starting points to find suitable
utility functions for non-functional properties.
Inter-subject disagreement: The elicited preferences exhibit considerable
inter-subject disagreement. This confirms the research goal to offer tool
support that can guide users towards mutually consistent preferences.
Problem understanding: The elicitation results can be interpreted as to in-
dicate that a considerable number of subjects find the trade-off problem
difficult to understand. The problem of dominating/dominated hypothet-
icals is one aspect of this, but the problem seems to extend beyond this
(as shown by the occurrence of not only systematically, but also randomly,
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spurious preferences). On an abstract level, this is in line with other re-
sults [25].
These observations point in the direction of several enhancements that could
be interesting future work.
The primacy of the stake-holders must be stressed – the mathematical ap-
paratus is just a tool, not an end in itself. Therefore, if stake-holders are not
satisfied with the solutions, it is important that a future mature decision-support
system allows for iterative solutions, where preferences once elicited are possible
to change and revise. Furthermore, such iterative elicitation also makes sense
from the perspective of avoiding unreasonable preferences, such as the ones illus-
trated in Fig. 6 or reported in [25]. A mature preference elicitation and modeling
system for non-functional properties should thus include more decision-support
to the user at the elicitation stage. The use of graphical depictions of indifference
curves is a good start, as judged by the subjects represented in Tables 1 and 2,
but can surely be improved, e.g. by allowing for alternative representations and
user-defined filtering options, and complemented with other alternatives, such
as heat maps for visually guiding the stake-holder in the elicitation process. It
would also be interesting to investigate how qualitative preferences, not based
on utility functions but comparisons only, fare – this might be more intuitive
to users. Another possible improvement would be to allow certain stakeholders
a bigger say for some properties, e.g. a chief security officer might need veto
power in some areas. In this respect, it would certainly be useful to provide
support for multiple stake-holder roles entailing different levels of editing and
visualization rights.
A more conceptual observation is that there is a need for better characteriza-
tion of trade-off preferences, not just in terms of standard utility functions, but
in terms of functions specifically tailored to suit particular properties. These
might have non-standard features, such as concavity. The discussion of the util-
ity function defined by the availability metric in Section 8.3 is one example of a
more specific utility function, but more work is clearly needed here. Such work
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would also shed more light on when it is appropriate to use elicitation from one
vs. several indifference curves.
Additionally, several interesting future research directions are suggested by
the results. A first such question has to do with how property trade-off prefer-
ences look like in practice, i.e. by doing more empirical elicitations of the kind
reported in Section 7. Such data would not only be interesting in its own right,
but could also be used to investigate whether preferences are consistent across
individuals, stake-holder types and roles, companies, or even entire industry
sectors such as automotive or telecom.
Another interesting research direction not previously addressed concerns un-
certainty in the property values, particularly relevant if these are based on es-
timates. What if, for instance, one property estimate has a large confidence
interval, but another one has a small one? How should they then be traded-off
against each other? Effective ways to elicit and model uncertainty are definitely
needed. Other interesting questions also stem from considering uncertainty, such
as the risk appetite of decision-makers and how that should best be elicited.
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